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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM

mention the 1952 agreement. Although the Court of Appeals opinion does not
42
bring out these facts, the per curiam opinion by the Appellate Division does
Bd.
POWER OF AmRITRATOR To AWARD DAMAGES FOR
BARGAINING AGREEMENT

BREACH OF

COLLECTIVE

In Publishers'Ass'n v. New York Stereo. U. No. 1, 43 the Court of Appeals
was called upon to determine whether an arbitration provision, embodied in a
collective bargaining agreement between the parties, authorized the arbitrators
to settle the question of damages. The provision in question provided that:
"'To this Committee [arbitration committee] shall be referred for settlement
,",
(Emphasis
any matter arising from the applicationof this agreement....
added.)
Although the defendant union concedes that the Committee has the power
to determine whether a work stoppage engaged in by sixty stereotypes employed
by plaintiff was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement between the
parties, it challenges the further power of the arbitrators to decide the question
of damages. The Court of Appeals expressed little hesitancy in affirming both
the Special Term and the Appellate Division,45 which had granted the plaintiff's
motion to direct the union to proceed to an arbitration of the whole matter.
There is little doubt in New York today that the courts will, when faced
with an arbitration clause of such general language as the present case, submit
the question of damages to arbitration. For, as stated by the Court in the
46
landmark case of In re Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co.:
Parties to a contract may agree, if they will, that any and all controversies growing out of it in any way shall be submitted to arbitration.
If they do, the Courts of New York will give effect to their intention.
A submission so phrased, or in form substantiallyequivalent, does not
limit the authority of the arbitrators to an adjudication of the breach.
It is authority to assess the damages against the party in default
(Matter of Gen. Footwear Co. v. Lawrence Leather Co., 252 N.Y.
577).47 (Emphasis added.)

In an attempt to stamp a restrictive intent upon the general language used
in the arbitration clause, the defendant reminded this-Court of the substantive
rule that an unincorporated association cannot be held liable except on proof
which would make all the members liable individually. "The union says that,
with this statutory immunity in existence, the intent of this agreement could
not have been to authorize an award of damages for a violation which involved
48
only about 60 of the union's 1,100 members."
42. Bronston v. Glassman, supra note 36 at 487, 212 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
43. 8 N.Y.2d 414, 208 N.Y.S.2d 981 (1960).
44. Id. at 416, 208 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
45. 10 A.D.2d 557, 197 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1960).
46. 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929).
47. Id. at 298-299, 169 N.E. at 391.
48. Publishers' Ass'n v. New York Stereo. U. No. 1, supra note 43 at 418, 208
N.Y.S.2d at 984.
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The Court refuted the agreement by stating that an arbitrator, when given
jurisdiction and authority by the voluntary agreement of the parties themselves, may do that which a court may otherwise be unable to do by reason of
the same legal restriction. For example, in In re Ruppert (Egelhlaer),49 the
Court held that arbitrators, under appropriate language in an agreement, could
order an injunction even though a regular court of law could have been prevented by Section 876-a of the New York Civil Practice Act from issuing an
injunction on the same facts. The more general answer is that if the intent
of the defendant was to restrict the Committee from
exercising the customary function of fixing damages, they probably
would have said so, especially since, under an earlier but apparently
identical form of arbitration agreement between these same parties,
the association had sought damages and the question of damages had
been tried out before arbitrators with no complaint from the union .... 50
The draftsman of an arbitration clause who wishes to place some restriction upon the jurisdiction and/or authority of the arbitrators should be careful
to articulate such limitation. Although the language in the present case was
certainly general enough to warrant the Court in finding within its intent a
mutual agreement to arbitrate the question of damages; this writer feels that
the Court would have decided the same way even with less persuasive language.
It appears that the present Court, or at least a majority of the present judges,
has committeed itself to a definite policy of increasing the jurisdiction of arbitrators. In support of this contention, the writer cites such recent cases as
2
De Laurentiis v. Cinematografica, Etc.51 and Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta.5
Bd.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT OF ACTUAL .NOTICE TO COMMENCE PERIOD OF
LIMITATION IN WHICH TO DEMAND A JURY TRIAL
It has uniformly been held that where immediate action is necessary, a
state, in the exercise of its police power, may temporarily confine an alleged
mentally ill person.1 The confinement may be had upon an application for an
ex parte order with no notice being given to the person to be confined, and
such a procedure is not in violation of the due process clauses of the Federal
49. 3 N.Y.2d 576, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958).
50. Publishers' Ass'n v. New York Stereo. U. No. 1, supra note 43 at 418, 208

N.Y.S.2d at 984. For a reference to the earlier case between these same parties, see In re
Publishers' Ass'n of New York City (New York Stereotypers' Union), 1 A.D.2d 941, 150
N.Y.S.2d 918 (1st Dep't 1956).
51. 9 N.Y.2d 356, 214 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1961).
52. 9 N.Y.2d 329, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961).
1. Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406 (1908); Matter of
Andrews, 126 App. Div. 794, 111 N.Y. Supp. 417 (1st Dep't 1908).
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